Whose Beliefs are Entitled to Protection?: Resolving the Conflicts between the California and Federal Standards by Nelson, Melissa L.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 27 | Number 2 Article 6
1-1-1987
Whose Beliefs are Entitled to Protection?:
Resolving the Conflicts between the California and
Federal Standards
Melissa L. Nelson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Melissa L. Nelson, Comment, Whose Beliefs are Entitled to Protection?: Resolving the Conflicts between the California and Federal
Standards, 27 Santa Clara L. Rev. 377 (1987).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss2/6
WHOSE BELIEFS ARE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION:
RESOLVING THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL STANDARDS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the whole galaxy of constitutional rights, there is none that is
more important than the "freedom of religion." It is enshrined
in our history, heritage, customs, and laws. Many of the first
settlers of the new world came in search of this freedom. It was
foremost in the minds of many of our nation's founding fathers,
perhaps the most notable being Thomas Jefferson. . . .Ratifi-
cation of the Constitution came only after it was agreed that this
freedom would be affirmatively protected, and one of the first
acts of the United States under its new Constitution was to
amend that Constitution to prevent any law "prohibiting the
free exercise" of religion.'
The first amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion." The right to the free exercise of religion holds a preferred
position8 along with the other substantive rights of the first amend-
ment: speech, press, assembly and petition.'
Although the free exercise guarantee is closely tied to other first
© 1987 by Melissa L. Nelson
1. Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
affd, 474 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 416 U.S. 932
(1974).
2. The first amendment of the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
3. "First Amendment freedoms of press, speech and religion are protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment from invasion by state action. . . .Such rights
have a paramount and preferred place in our democratic system .. " Weaver v. Jordan, 64
Cal. 2d 235, 241, 411 P.2d 289, 293, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 541 (1966). See also Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (reversal of a conviction against Jehovah's Witnesses
for distributing religious pamphlets without a license). "Freedom of press, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion are in a preferred position." Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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amendment rights which provide for freedoms of belief and action,"
the free exercise of religion is a separate and complete substantive
right. The notion of "exercise" encompasses both belief and action.
By virtue of the free exercise clause, individuals are assured that
neither Congress nor the states may prohibit, restrict or inhibit reli-
gious belief." Although the right to hold religious beliefs is absolute,7
religious action must necessarily be restricted. In the absence of re-
strictions on religious action, the free exercise clause might be abused
as a license for unlawful activity.
The California Constitution contains language closely resem-
bling the free exercise clause of the first amendment.' Similar to the
United States Supreme Court, California courts have held that
religious liberty includes an absolute freedom to believe, but only a
limited right to act.9
Under the California Constitution, the State is required to
grant to claimants of religious freedom equal or greater protection
than that afforded by the first amendment guarantee of the United
States Constitution.10 Currently, however, Californians claiming free
exercise violations receive less protection under California law than
under federal law. The inadequate protection afforded to California
claimants is the result of a conflict between California and federal
law pertaining to the free exercise of religion.
This comment examines the causes and effects of the conflict
between the California and federal free exercise standards. It begins
5. Sheffer, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Free Exercise Clause: Are Standards of
Adjudication Possible?, 23 J. CHURCH & STATE 533, 534 (1981).
6. The free exercise clause "categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohib-
iting or rewarding religious beliefs as such." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978). In
McDaniel, appellant, a Baptist minister, was disqualified from serving as a delegate to a Ten-
nessee constitutional convention based on a Tennessee statutory provision barring ministers or
priests of any denomination from membership in the State House of Representatives. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that the statute violated McDaniel's right to free exercise of
religion because the state conditioned the exercise of one right (to seek and hold office) upon
another (free exercise). Id.
7. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
8. Article I section 4 of the California Constitution states:
Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion. A person is not incompetent to be a
witness or juror because of his or her opinion on religious beliefs.
CAL. CONsr. art. 1, § 4.
9. CAL. CONST. REV. COMM'N, art. 1, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS: BACKGROUND
STUDY no.3, at 12 (1970).
10. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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by reviewing the current United States Supreme Court and Califor-
nia free exercise tests. The focus then turns to the two sources which
produce inadequate protection for free exercise claims under Califor-
nia law: 1) the expansive United States Supreme Court definition of
religion; and 2) the inconsistency between the United States Supreme
Court free exercise decision, Thomas v. Review Board of the Indi-
ana Employment Security Division," and the leading California free
exercise case, People v. Woody. 2 Finally, this comment offers a pro-
posal which will resolve the conflict between California and federal
law and eliminate the ambiguity pervading the present federal
standard.
II. BACKGROUND
A. United States Supreme Court Standard
The United States Supreme Court is primarily responsible for
defining the parameters of constitutional rights and determining the
limits of religious freedom.' It is appropriate, therefore, to examine
the framework established by the Court through its line of free exer-
cise cases.
1. Definition of Religion
A definition of religion is inherent in every free exercise claim.' 4
Religion must be defined before "the free exercise of religion" can be
guaranteed. Despite the need for a definition, the Court has re-
mained silent in this area. The Court's silence may be explained by
the fact that the establishment clause of the first amendment prevents
the government from favoring, establishing or promoting any form of
religion. 6 A definition of religion, though necessary for enforcement
11. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
12. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
13. As one commentator has aptly stated:
Any legal definition of free exercise, if one is even possible, will come from the
Supreme Court. Its acceptance or rejection by a majority of the people will
ultimately depend on their willingness to have the Court substitute its current
legal values in defining free exercise for their own psychologically oriented spiri-
tual values. They have usually allowed the Court's definition to stand.
ShelTer, supra note 5, at 535.
14. "An individual can claim protection under the free exercise clause only for sincerely
held beliefs which are properly characterized as 'religious.' " Cole v. Fulcomer, 588 F. Supp.
772, 772 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (Native American belief constitutes a "religion" within the meaning
of the first amendment).
15. The establishment clause of the first amendment prohibits Congress from making
laws establishing religion. The U.S. Supreme Court seems to fear that if they actually define
19871
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of the free exercise clause, might subject the Court to claims that it
was promoting particular religious practices.' 6
The last explicit constitutional definition of religion given by
the Supreme Court came in Davis v. Beason," an 1890 case involv-
ing a statute prohibiting polygamy and the free exercise rights of
Mormons. The Court referred to religion as "one's views of his rela-
tions to his Creator, and to the obligations imposed of reverence for
His being and character and of obedience to His will." 8 The theistic
orientation of the Davis definition has been criticized by later deci-
sions and for the most part, is no longer followed by the Court."'
religion for free exercise purposes the establishment clause will be violated.
Although there are no statements by the Court which explicitly refuse to define religion,
cases such as Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), hint at such refusal. Torcaso involved
the invalidation of a state requirement that an appointee to a public office declare his belief in
the existence of God. The Court held that a state's preference for theistic religions over non-
theistic religions violated the establishment clause. The Court stated:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal government
can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any reli-
gion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid
all religions as against non-believers and neither can aid those religions based on
a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs.
Id. at 495. See generally Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 753 (1984); Sheffer, supra note 5; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
812-85 (1978).
16. The Supreme Court has recognized that there is an overlap between the two religion
clauses. The Court explained the overlap in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1962) (holding that the establishment clause prohibits state laws or school boards from
requiring students to read bible passages or pray at the beginning of each school day). The
Court stated:
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from
a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might
bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or
dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or
Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodo-
xies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further reason for neutral-
ity is found in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes the value of religious
training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every per-
son to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compul-
sion from the state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees. Thus, as we have
seen, the two clauses may overlap.
Id. at 222.
17. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
18. Id. at 342.
19. Professor Tribe explained the shift away from the theistic orientation of the defini-
tion of religion as follows:
Religion in America, always pluralistic, has become radically so in the latter
part of the twentieth century. In colonial times there were dozens of major reli-
gious groups; today there are well over 250 recognized major churches and this
number does not include hundreds of smaller "fringe" groups. Even within a
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The most recent Supreme Court discussions of the definition of
religion have come in connection with the Court's efforts to construe
section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act20 in
conscientious objector cases. Under the Act, Congress construed reli-
gious belief as "an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but [not including] essentially political, sociological or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code."'"
The United States Supreme Court attempted to define religion
under the Act in United States v. Seeger 2 and Welsh v. United
States.28 In Seeger, the Court reconciled the congressional language
of the Act with an individual who rejected dependence on a Creator
as a guide to morality and was devoted instead to virtue and good-
ness.24 Although the language of the Act required an individual to
single religion - Christianity - tremendous diversity has occurred, with some
Christian groups formally accepting members who regard the concept of "God"
as irrelevant or even harmful. . . .These changed circumstances made it all
but inevitable that the Supreme Court would modify the narrow understanding
of "religion" that had characterized the early development of this area of the
law.
L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 826 & nn.5-7.
20. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1964). The Act states:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed
to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connec-
tion means an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essen-
tially political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code.
Id.
21. Id. Subsection j of the Act was amended in 1967, subsequent to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The amendment deleted the reference
to a "Supreme Being" and reads as follows:
(j) Nothing contained in this title [sections 451 to 471a of this Appendix]
shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and
service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious
training or belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
As used in this subsection, the term "religious training and belief" does not
include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views, or a merely per-
sonal moral code.
50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976). For further discussion of this area, see also Greenawalt, supra
note 15, at 759.
22. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). It is also interesting to note that the free exercise guarantee
does not include the right to be a conscientious objector. See generally L. PFEFFER, RELIGION,
STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT 151 (1984).
23. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
24. Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 760.
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believe .in a Supreme Being in order to qualify as a conscientious
objector, the Court held that Congress did not intend a purely theis-
tic definition of religion in the statute. The Court concluded that
Seeger fell within the Act's conscientious objector exemption because
he held "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life
of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption ... 25
The Court further expanded its interpretation of religion under
the Act in Welsh v. United States.2' Unlike Seeger, who admitted to
some form of religious belief, Welsh refused to sign his selective ser-
vice form until the words "my religious training" were crossed out.
He would neither affirm nor deny his belief in a "Supreme Being. "2'
Although Welsh's objections were based in part on his perception of
world politics, the Court upheld his petition, stating:
We certainly do not think that § 6(j)'s exclusion of those per-
sons with "essentially political, sociological or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code" should be read to ex-
clude those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and
foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to
participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon
considerations of public policy.28
The Court reaffirmed the definition formulated in Seeger, and
held that since Welsh kept his beliefs with the "strength of more
traditional religious convictions, he was clearly entitled to a conscien-
tious objector exemption."' 2' Although it might be argued that the
Seeger-Welsh definition is limited to a statutory interpretation of the
Act, it is the only current Court authority on the definition of reli-
gion. The Seeger-Welsh definition has value as an indicator of what
the Court might decide were it ever to define religion explicitly for
free exercise purposes. 80
25. 380 U.S. at 176.
26. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
27. Id. at 337.
28. Id. at 342.
29. Id. at 343.
30. Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 761. "[T]he Supreme Court's broad statutory con-
struction of religion, as well as its decision in Torcaso, has led other courts and scholars to
assume that the constitutional definition of religion is now much more expansive than it once
appeared to be." Id. See generally Comment, "Mind Control" or Intensity of Faith: The
Constitutional Protection of Religious Beliefs, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 751, 762 (1978);
L. PFEFFERt, supra note 22, at 151. For other interpretations of "religion," see also Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981)
(religion defined as an individual's "ultimate concern - whatever that concern may be"); U.S.
v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943) (religion involves the believer's categorical "disre-
[Vol. 27
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As a result of Seeger and Welsh, the current definition of reli-
gion is virtually open-ended. The Court has narrowed the term
"religion" in only one respect: in Welsh, the Court stated that beliefs
resting "solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism or expedi-
ency""5 are non-religious.
2. Standard of Review for Free Exercise Claims
Despite the open-ended nature of the definition of religion,
every free exercise claim necessarily includes such a definition. Once
the court finds that an asserted claim is religious in nature, the free
exercise clause guarantees that each individual may believe in and
practice his religion so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of
others in a way which invokes the police power of the state or fed-
eral government."2 In 1940, the Supreme Court elaborated on this
belief-action dichotomy in Cantwell v. Connecticut,"3 stating:
The [First] Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to be-
lieve and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature
of things, the second cannot be. . . . Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must
have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that
protection . 4
gard [of] elementary self-interest . . . in preference to transgressing [the religion's] tenets").
31. 398 U.S. at 343. Religious claims which fall outside of the Seeger-Welsh definition
generally tend to have strong political overtones. See, e.g., U.S. v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir.
1985). In Allen, appellants claimed that a "national religion of nuclearism . . . in which the
bomb is the new source of salvation" had arisen. The "religion" supposedly focused on the
"acceptance of nuclear weapons as sacred objects." In denying appellants' claims under both
the establishment and free exercise clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the court stated:
This expansive definition of religion has been developed primarily to protect an
individual's free exercise of religion, recognizing that an individual's most sin-
cere beliefs do not necessarily fall within traditional religious categories. In this
case, however, appellants ask us to recognize as a "religion" what that religion's
alleged adherents have not identified as such ...
Id. at 450. The court went on to hold: "The two sides in the nuclear debate thus differ pri-
marily in their perception of the way the world works, not necessarily in their ultimate con-
cern for world peace. This difference we hold to be one of political judgment, not religious
belief." Id.
32. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 846-53. For a list of types of claims
which have been required to yield to states' interest in keeping the "public safety, peace or
order," see Allen, 760 F.2d at 452-53.
33. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Petitioners, Jehovah's Witnesses, were charged with a statu-
tory breach of the peace violation after playing a phonograph record on the street. The record
embodied a general attack on all organized religious systems, specifically singling out the Ro-
man Catholic Church. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction as a violation of petitioners
right of free exercise of religion.
34. Id. at 303-04.
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Apart from the basic belief-action distinction, it is quite difficult
to determine the full scope of protection afforded to religious exer-
cise. In general, the Supreme Court will take the following approach
to a free exercise claim. Initially, the claimant must prove that he
holds a sincere religious belief leading to action which is either di-
rectly forbidden or indirectly stifled by the government."5 In order to
meet his burden, the claimant must show that the government action
"actually burdens his freedom to exercise religious rights."36 The
burden then shifts to the government to show that such interference
is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest which cannot
be satisfied by any less restrictive means. 7
35. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct pro-
scribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct
mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adher-
ent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden on religion exists,
while the compulsion may be indirect, the burden may, nonetheless, be
substantial.
Id.
36. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1963
(1985). "It is virtually self-evident that the free exercise clause does not require an exemption
from a governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually bur-
dens the claimant's freedom to exercise religious rights." Id. (involved issue of whether mini-
mum wage, overtime and record keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act apply
to workers engaged in the commercial activities of a religious foundation).
37. "The government must shoulder a heavy burden to defend a regulation affecting
religious actions. It is usually said that the challenged regulation must be the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling state interest." Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th
Cir. 1984) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963)). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 859-63.
Although a majority of the current U.S. Supreme Court still applies the compelling state
interest test in all free exercise cases, three justices recently proposed a new test in Bowen v.
Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986). In Bowen, a plurality opinion, the appellees were recipients of
benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamp
programs. Federal statutes require that all participants in those programs furnish the state
welfare agencies with the social security numbers of all household members in order to receive
benefits. Appellees, Native Americans, refused to furnish a social security number for their two
year old daughter, "Little Bird of the Snow," contending that such a requirement violated
their religious beliefs that the use of the number would harm their daughter's spirit. Subse-
quently, the state of Pennsylvania terminated AFDC benefits payable on the child's behalf.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor and
Chief Justice Burger joined in parts I and II of the opinion in which the Court denied the
appellees' claim. The Court based its opinion on the grounds that the first amendment does not
require the government to
behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual de-
velopment or that of his or her family. . . .The Free Exercise Clause affords
an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does
not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's inter-
nal procedures.
Id. at 2152.
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In determining the claimant's initial burden, the Court has
highlighted several elements which must be examined in order to
understand the parameters of the right to the free exercise of reli-
gion. Commentators have described the elements as sincerity, cen-
trality, longevity and individuality,"8 each of which will be discussed
in turn. The Court looks to each element in order to determine
whether or not a claimant has met his burden of proof. The focus of
this comment will be on the first half of the test - the claimant's
burden of proof.
a. Sincerity
As a threshold standard, an objector to a government regulation
or requirement must ground his complaint upon a sincerely held re-
ligious belief. The majority opinion in United States v. Ballard
stands for this principle.3 9 In Ballard, the Court was called upon to
determine the validity of a guilty verdict against the organizers of a
cult, known as the "I Am" movement, for fraudulent use of the
mails. The Ballards represented themselves as divine messengers
having supernatural powers to heal incurable illnesses. 0
Part III of the opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, reviewed the appellees challenge to Congress' requirement that a state AFDC plan
must require all recipients of aid to furnish their social security numbers as a condition of
eligibility for the program. In addressing this challenge, the Justices distinguished between
direct and indirect government burdens upon free exercise claims and proposed the following
standard of review: "Absent proof of an intent to discriminate against a particular religion's
beliefs or against religion in general, the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates
that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its applica-
tion, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Id. at 2156.
Under the proposed standard, only when members of a religious group are treated un-
equally would the government be required to demonstrate a compelling interest in denying the
requested exemption. Since the requirement that AFDC and Food Stamp applicants provide
social security numbers is facially neutral and applies equally to all applicants, the govern-
ment's burden is significantly reduced: they need only prove that the requirements are a
reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest. If the test proposed by part III of
Bowen v. Roy is adopted by a majority of the Court, the amount of protection granted to
religious free exercise will be drastically reduced.
38. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 846-53.
39. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See also U.S. v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981). Appel-
lants, convicted of mail fraud, contended that their allegedly fraudulent "Dare to be Rich"
program was a religious tenet of the Church of Hakeem, and thus, the first amendment pre-
vented the government from testing the truth or falsity of a religious tenet. The court held that
the issue was not whether the "Dare to be Rich" program was true or false. Rather, the
inquiry focused on whether appellants held sincere beliefs in the allegedly fraudulent aspects
of the program. The court stated: "If they made assertions with knowledge of the falsity of
those assertions, then they could not have been acting pursuant to sincere religious belief." Id.
at 847.
40. 322 U.S. at 79. See also L. PFEFFER, supra note 22, at 205.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas maintained that govern-
mental inquiry into the truth or falsity of a religious belief should
not be allowed. The only issue to be addressed is whether the ques-
tioned beliefs are sincerely held.4 According to one commentator,
"what the Court held, in effect, was that no agency of the secular
state, including a jury, may pass judgment upon the factual reality of
religious beliefs or religious experiences."42 Under the Ballard
Court's analysis, free exercise protection is triggered by the fact that
a belief is determined to be religious. Once a bona fide religious
belief is established, the only remaining factual issue is whether a
petitioner actually believes his own claim."
The purpose of inquiring into the sincerity of a belief is to pre-
vent abuse by claimants and to protect against an individual's
attempt to cloak fraudulent practices in religious garb."" However, if
free exercise claims were decided on the basis of sincerity alone, any
philosophy might be regarded as a religion simply because a claim-
ant believed in it. In light of the dangers inherent in the sincerity
factor, the Court has required other factors to be present in order for
a belief to receive free exercise protection.
b. Centrality
Centrality is a factor closely related to sincerity. In examining
the centrality of a claimant's belief, the Court will focus on the rela-
tionship of the claimed belief to the beliefs of an established religious
group. The Court's aim is to determine whether the claimant's belief
is central to the tenets of the religious group.
41. 322 U.S. at 80.
42. L. PFEFFER, supra note 22, at 205-06.
43. According to the Ballard Court:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they can-
not prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incom-
prehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals
does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law. . . .The religious
viewls] espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to
most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with
finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with religious beliefs of
any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden
domain.
322 U.S. at 86-87.
44. Comment, supra note 30, at 763 (citing U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)).
See also Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1984). "First Amendment religious pro-
tection is not extended to so-called religions which tend to mock established institutions and are
obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincer-
ity." Id. at 664 (citing Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974)).
[Vol. 27
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By functioning as an objective base, centrality offers guidance
beyond the subjectivity of the sincerity factor. The importance of the
centrality factor was highlighted by Professor Tribe when he wrote:
"Clearly a conflict which threatens the very survival of the religion
or the core values of a faith poses more serious free exercise
problems than does a conflict which merely inconveniences the
faithful.
4
"
The Supreme Court focused on the centrality factor in a 1963
decision, Sherbert v. Verner." Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist,
was fired because she refused to work on Saturdays. She filed suit
claiming a free exercise violation after her state unemployment
benefits were denied. In reversing the denial of benefits, the Court's
opinion rested in part on the fact that for Sherbert, working on Sat-
urdays would be a violation of a "cardinal principle of her religious
faith."47 The Court stated:
Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibil-
ity for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion,
but the pressures upon her to forego that practice are unmistak-
able. The ruling forces her to choose between precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and aban-
doning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other. To condition the availability of benefits
upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle
of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her
constitutional liberties."8
Because Sherbert's religiously-based action of refusing to work on
her Sabbath was central to the Seventh Day Adventist religion, the
Court upheld her claim.
Wisconsin v. Yoder" is another free exercise case which turned
on the centrality of the claimant's belief. Yoder, a member of the Old
Order Amish Church, contended that the state compulsory school at-
tendance statute violated his own religious beliefs and those of his
children."0 According to the Amish religion, parents were required to
45. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 862.
46. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
47. Id. at 406.
48. Id.
49. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50. Id. See also L. PFEFFER, supra note 22, at 59.
The religious convictions of the Amish, based on the biblical injunction for
the Epistle of Paul to the Romans "Be not conformed to this world," forbade
them to send their children to school after they had completed elementary
schooling, not withstanding a statute requiring attendance until the age of 16.
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educate their children at home after the eighth grade. Deciding the
case under the compelling state interest standard,5 the Court upheld
Yoder's claim in a decision which affirmed that centrality was an
important factor to consider when determining the quality of a free
exercise claim. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated:
In evaluating those claims we must be careful to determine
whether the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as
they claim, inseparable and interdependent. A way of life, how-
ever virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier
to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on
purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Reli-
gion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.52
Yoder's claim was inseparable from and interdependent upon his
way of life as a member of the Old Order Amish. Yoder's belief,
shared by all the members of his sect, was thus central to the beliefs
of an organized religious group. 3
c. Longevity
A second important factor in the Yoder decision was the longev-
ity of the religion. The Court gave great import to the fact that both
the Amish religion, as well as their informal program of vocational
education, has been practiced consistently for almost three hundred
years.54 In the context of a discussion of whether the compulsory
school attendance laws posed the threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice, the Court emphasized:
[T]he danger to the continued existence of an ancient religious
faith cannot be ignored simply because of the assumption that
its adherents will be able, at considerable sacrifice, to relocate in
some more tolerant State or country. . . . Forced migration of
religious minorities was an evil that lay at the heart of the Reli-
gion Clauses.5
In sum, the combination of the centrality and the longevity of the
Id.
51. 406 U.S. at 215. "The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is
that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id.
52. Id. at 215-16.
53. Id. at 210. "Broadly speaking, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and deter-
mines the entire mode of life of its adherents. Their conduct is regulated in great detail by the
Ordnung, or rules of the church community." Id.
54. Id. at 219.
55. Id. at 218 n.9.
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Amish religious belief was strong enough to overcome the compelling
state interest in compulsory education.
d. Individuality
A third factor was added to the standards of review utilized by
the Supreme Court in free exercise claims in Thomas v. Review
Board." In Thomas, the Court moved away from the centrality
focus of Sherbert v. Verner57 and Wisconsin v. Yoder"' toward an
emphasis on the individual's belief. The case presented a fact situa-
tion similar to that addressed in Sherbert: a claim of free exercise
violation arising out of the denial of unemployment benefits. 9
Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, was employed in the roll foun-
dry of an Indiana weapons manufacturer. The roll foundry
fabricated sheet steel for industrial uses and was the only department
which was not engaged in weapons production. Subsequently, the
foundry was closed down and Thomas was transferred to a job mak-
ing turrets for various weapons. Asserting that his religious beliefs
prevented him from participating in the production of weapons,
Thomas requested a lay-off. When the lay-off was denied, Thomas
quit his job and unsuccessfully filed for unemployment benefits. 60
Although the Court reviewed the lower court judgment in light of
Sherbert,6 Thomas represents a potentially significant expansion in
the amount of protection available to free exercise claimants. 2
The potential expansion of free exercise protection represented
by Thomas becomes apparent through a comparison of its facts with
the facts of Sherbert. The important difference between Sherbert's
and Thomas' claims is that Sherbert was practicing a cardinal tenet
of her faith, central to the Seventh Day Adventist religion in refusing
to work on her Sabbath."3 Thomas, on the other hand, was advised
by a co-worker, a fellow Jehovah's Witness, that scripture did not
bar working on weapons."" Despite both the lack of centrality to the
56. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
57. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
58. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
59. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
60. 450 U.S. at 714.
61. Id. at 713.
62. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1983). "We agree that the
First Amendment protection of religion does not turn on the theological importance of the
disputed activity, and that courts may not dictate which practices are or are not required in a
particular religion." Id. (citations omitted).
63. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
64. 450 U.S. at 711.
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faith and the fact that Thomas himself admitted that he was "strug-
gling" with his beliefs and unable to articulate them precisely,"' the
Court upheld his claim. In reaching its conclusion, the Court offered
the following advice for reviewing religious claims:
Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because
the believer admits he is "struggling" with his position or be-
cause his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and
precision that a more sophisticated person might employ ...
Intra-faith differences are not uncommon among followers of a
particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill-
equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion
Clauses."
Although the Thomas decision seems to arrive at an opposite
conclusion than one might expect after the emphasis on centrality
and longevity seen in Sherbert and Yoder, the Court relied on other
aspects of these cases throughout the opinion and made no mention
of the apparent inconsistencies. It is therefore unclear exactly how
far the United States Supreme Court will extend free exercise pro-
tection to individual religious beliefs. The only real guidance given
by Thomas is the following language:
One can, of course, imagine an asserted belief so bizarre, so
clearly non-religious in motivation, as not to be entitled to pro-
tection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case
here, and the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs
which are shared by all the members of a religious sect.6"
B. California Law
Cases such as Thomas, 8 Sherbert, 6 and Yoder70 provide guid-
ance to California courts because the language of the California
Constitution offers free exercise protection similar to that guaranteed
by the first amendment of the United States Constitution. Article 1
section 4 of the California Constitution states: "Free exercise and
enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are guar-
65. Id. at 715. The lower court struck down the claim on the basis that Thomas had
made a merely "personal, philosophical choice rather than a religious choice ...and would
not object to working in a steel plant producing the raw product necessary for the production
of tanks." Id. at 713-14.
66. Id. at 715.
67. Id. at 715-16.
68. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
69. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
70. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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anteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licen-
tious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State .... ,,7'
Presently, in California, free exercise claims are subjected to a
two-tiered standard of review similar to the standard utilized by the
United States Supreme Court. The claimant must first establish that
the challenged statute or state action interferes with a sincerely held
religious belief. 2 Then the state must prove the existence of a com-
pelling interest which overrides the claimant's free exercise rights.7
Comparing the United States and California Constitutions, the Cali-
fornia Constitution Revision Commission noted, however, that
"[ajlthough California and federal standards in this area appear to
be analogous, it might be argued that section 4 offers broader protec-
tion because it specifically refers to the 'liberty of conscience.'
Traditional notions of 'religion' are doubtless more narrow than
those of 'conscience' existing apart from institutionalized
traditions." 4
1. Definition of Religion
The California courts have been more articulate in the area of
defining religion under its constitution than the United States Su-
preme Court has been under the first amendment. California adheres
to a broad legal definition set forth by a California appellate court in
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda." In that case, the
court decided the fundamental question of whether the belief in God
or gods is essential to "religious worship" for the purposes of article
XIII, section 11 of the California Constitution.7  In dictum, the
court set forth the following definition of "religion":
Religion simply includes: (1) a belief, not necessarily referring
to supernatural powers; (2) a cult, involving a gregarious associ-
ation openly expressing the belief; (3) a system of moral
practice directly resulting from an adherence to the belief; (4)
71. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
72. County of El Dorado v. Schneider, 183 Cal. App. 3d 752, 228 Cal Rptr. 531 (1986)
(defendant's claim that California Evidence Code section 892 violated his first amendment
right was denied as he made no showing that the order for blood tests would interfere with his
religion).
73. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
74. CAL. CONST. REV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 14.
75. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 693, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957).
76. Id. at 678, 315 P.2d at 397. Article XIII section 1 provides in part: "All buildings
and so much of the real property on which they are situated as may be required for the
convenient use and occupancy of said buildings, when the same are used solely and exclusively
for religious worship ...shall be free from taxation." CAL. CONST. art XIII, § 11 .
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an organization within the cult designed to observe the tenets of
the belief. The content of the belief is of no moment."
This definition has been cited with approval in later appellate
decisions. 78
Another case which offers useful insight into the early ideas of
religious liberty in California, has been ignored by California courts
in recent years. The court in Hardwick v. Board of School Trust-
ees 79 provided the following interpretation of article I section 4 of the
California Constitution:
These constitutional guarantees invest every citizen of this coun-
try with the right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of his own conscience . . . so long as such worship is
not offensive to the common sentiments of civilized mankind or
is not offensive to the public peace and good order.80
Perhaps the reason that Hardwick has been ignored is that it
ties in the constitutional guarantee of free exercise with "Almighty
God." California courts seem to disfavor theistic definitions of
religion in favor of the broader notion set forth in Fellowship of Hu-
manity v. County of Alameda.8
A second portion of the Hardwick decision, which has received
no mention at all in recent California decisions, is strikingly similar
to the language of the United States Supreme Court case, Thomas v.
77. Fellowship of Humanity, 153 Cal. App. 2d at 693, 315 P.2d at 406. It is also inter-
esting to note that in a pre-Seeger decision, the California appellate court stated substantially
the same formula as employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Seeger.
Thus, the only inquiry in such a case is the objective one of whether or not the
belief occupies the same place in the lives of its holders that orthodox beliefs
occupy in the lives of believing majorities, and whether a given group that
claims the exemption conducts itself the way groups conceded to be religious
conduct themselves.
id.
78. The Fellowship of Humanity definition of religion was affirmed in 1981 by an ap-
pellate court in Young Life Campaign v. Patino, 122 Cal. App. 3d 559, 176 Cal. Rptr. 23
(1981). Although the concern in Young Life Campaign was the definition of "church" for tax
exemption purposes, the court cited the Fellowship of Humanity definition with approval in a
lengthy discussion of "church" and "religion." Id. at 564 n.8, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 28 n.8. See
also In re Serna, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 143 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1978) (Stephens, J., dissenting)
(invovled a habeas corpus appeal by prison inmates, as pastors of the Universal Life Church,
seeking to be allowed to conduct religious services and to establish a bank account outside the
prison).
79. 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921). The issue in Hardwick is whether the children
of persons who are conscientiously opposed to dancing in any form, can be compelled to dance
in public schools.
80. Id. at 705, 205 P. at 52.
81. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957). See supra note 77 and accompanying
text.
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Review Board."2 In reference to the constitutional principle stated
above, the Hardwick court went on to explain:
[They] are not alone applicable to religious organizations or to
persons actively affiliated with such organizations. They apply
as well to any person having religious convictions irrespective of
whether he is a member of any church or other religious society.
Manifestly, a person may have religious views or principles of
his own, different, perhaps, on doctrinal matters, from those of
any church organization or any other person. . . . There is no
logical ground for holding that in thus worshiping his Maker,
he is not equally entitled with every other person or church so-
ciety to the protection of the constitutional guarantees to which
we have above averted.63
The reasons why later California courts have ignored the principles
set forth in Hardwick are unclear, but the case appears to have been
lost in the shadows of the landmark decision on free exercise issues,
People v. Woody. "
2. Standard of Review
People v. Woody involved a claim by members of the Native
American Church that they had a constitutional right to use peyote,
an hallucinogenic drug, in their religious ceremonies. The California
Supreme Court focused on the centrality and longevity factors8" and
exempted the Indians from criminal sanctions prohibiting the use of
the drug."
a. Centrality
The court found, first of all, that peyote usage was a practice
central to this particular organized religious group.8" The Native
82. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
83. Hardwick, 54 Cal. App. at 706, 205 P. at 55.
84. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
85. The sincerity of the Indian's belief was not a major contention in the case. In rela-
tionship to this factor, however, the California Supreme Court followed the standards set forth
in Ballard. The Woody court stated:
[A]lthough judicial examination of the truth or validity of religious beliefs is
foreclosed by the First Amendment, the courts of necessity must ask whether the
claimant holds his beliefs honestly and in good faith, or whether he seeks to
wear the mantle of religious immunity merely as a cloak for illegal activities.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 726, 394 P.2d at 823, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
86. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
87. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72. See generally text accompanying
notes 45-53.
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American Church is a religious organization of Indians with esti-
mated membership of 30,000 to 250,000.88 Basic to the theology of
the church is the belief that peyote embodies the Holy Spirit and
those who ingest peyote enter into direct contact with God. Peyote
serves as more than a sacramental symbol; it is an object of worship
to which prayers are directed.89 In reaching the decision to uphold
the Indians' claim, the court found the centrality factor decisive.
Peyote "is the sine qua non of defendants' faith. It is the sole means
by which defendants are able to experience their religion: without
peyote, defendants cannot practice their religion." 90 The court felt
that to apply the statutory prohibition against the use of peyote to
the Native American Church would be, in effect, to "remove the the-
ological heart" of their religion."
b. Longevity
Along with centrality, longevity was a key element in the
Woody court's analysis. The court looked specifically into the histori-
cal background of the Native American religion. The importance of
the long history of peyotism is emphasized by the court's statement:
A reference to the religious use of peyote appears in Spanish
historical sources as early as 1560. Peyotism spread from Mex-
ico to the United States and Canada; American anthropologists
describe it as well established in this country during the latter
part of the nineteenth century. Today, Indians of many tribes
practice peyotism.92
The longevity of the religion combined with a claim which was cen-
tral to an organized religious group, formed a free exercise argument
powerful enough to override the state's compelling interest in enforc-
ing criminal sanctions.S
88. 61 Cal. 2d at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. The Court explained that
the wide variance in numbers derives from dilfering definitions of "member."
89. Id. at 720-21, 394 P.2d at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73.
On the other hand, to use peyote for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious.
Members of the church regard peyote also as a "teacher" because it induces a
feeling of brotherhood with other members; indeed, it enables the participants to
experience the Deity. Finally, devotees treat peyote as a "protector." Much as a
Catholic carries his medallion, an Indian G.I. often wears around his neck a
beautifully beaded pouch containing one large peyote button.
Id.
90. Id. at 725, 394 P.2d at 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
91. Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
92. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
93. The exceptional strength of the claim made in Woody, and the strictness of the Cali-
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c. Individuality
Although the Woody decision discussed the sincerity, longevity
and centrality factors utilized by the United States Supreme Court,
the case did not reach the issue of individuality. In fact, aside from
the language in Hardwick pertaining to persons not actively affili-
ated with religious organizations,9 4 the closest any California court
has come to addressing the federal individuality factor found in
Thomas v. Review Board9" is a footnote in a 1979 appellate decision,
Mullaney v. Woods. 6 In that case, petitioner Mullaney refused to
apply for social security numbers for her children based on a "strong
religious belief that social security numbers are the 'mark of the
beast' referred to in Revelation 14 and 15 and would prevent her
children from going to heaven. ' '97 As there was no record of the ad-
ministrative hearing in the case, the only evidence before the court
bearing on the question of the validity of the free exercise claim was
Mullaney's statement that her views constituted a sincere religious
belief. The Administrative Director admitted the truth of the peti-
tioner's allegation, thus foreclosing the court from further review on
the question of the sincerity of her beliefs.
fornia court's standard, is exemplified by subsequent cases applying the standard in which the
plaintiffs failed to meet their high burden of proof. See, e.g., People v. Torres, 133 Cal. App.
3d 265, 184 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1982). In Torres, the court struck down the defendant's claimed
right to use marijuana in church. Although marijuana was considered a sacrament, the court
found that it was not an indispensable part of the defendant's church. In Pines v. Thomson,
160 Cal. App. 3d 379, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1984), the appellate court upheld a trial court
injunction ordering appellant, "Christian Yellow Pages," to refrain from discriminating
against advertisers on the basis of religion. The court held that since the injunction did not
require appellants to endorse religious beliefs or practices of non-Christian advertisers or to
alter their own beliefs, appellants had not shown that the injunction would materially abridge
their right to free exercise of religion. Id. at 389, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 878. In People v. Mullins,
50 Cal. App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1975), defendant's claimed right to grow marijuana
for use in religious ceremonies was struck down.
94. See supra text accompanying note 83.
95. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
96. 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979).
97. Id. at 723, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 908. The "mark of the beast" is a biblical term which
denotes subservience to anti-Christian powers. Lorna Mullaney's fear of the "mark" derives
from scripture passages such as Revelation 14:9-11 which states:
If any one worships the beast and his image, and receives a mark on his fore-
head or upon his hand, he also will drink of the wine of the wrath of God,
which is mixed in full strength in the cup of His anger; and he will be tor-
mented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the
presence of the Lamb. And the smoke of their torment goes up forever and ever;
and they have no rest day and night, those who worship the beast and his im-
age, whoever receives the mark of his name.
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Despite the procedural foreclosure in the Mullaney case, the
court stated in a footnote that an individual's religious claim, how-
ever sincere, might not be upheld if not central to the beliefs of an
organized religious group:
It is worth noting that those free exercise cases in which
the state's interest has been forced to yield to an individual's
religious claim have differed from this case in two highly signif-
icant respects: they have (1) concerned a cardinal principle of
(2) an "orthodox" or "organized" religion whose genuineness
was unquestioned . .. Surely there is a qualitative difference
between impinging upon practices which are virtual forms of
holy worship for believers (as in Sherbert, Cantwell and
Woody) or integral parts of and inseparable from a religious
way of life (as in Yoder) . . . and requiring a person who ad-
heres to no general religious beliefs or practices but reads the
Bible in such a manner as to make social security numbers
marks of damnation, to procure numbers for her children or else
forego the government benefits she seeks."
Apparently, this particular California court would not look favorably
upon the extension of free exercise protection to an individual's sin-
cerely held religious belief which is not central to the beliefs of an
organized religious group. To date, no other California courts have
had the opportunity to rule explicitly on the issue.
III. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL
FREE EXERCISE STANDARDS
Cases such as Mullaney v. Woods"' and People v. Woody 00
present a California court reviewing a free exercise claim with a
barrage of conflicting standards. Any time the general question of
religious freedom arises,101 courts must ensure that the claimant's
rights have not been violated under either federal or state constitu-
tional law. It is well established that federal cases are dispositive of
federal constitutional questions, while both state and federal cases
serve as authority for state constitutional claims.10
98. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 723-24 n.16, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09 n.16.
99. 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979).
100. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
101. For a lengthy list evidencing the wide variety of areas in which free exercise claims
may arise, see Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 984-85, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 253-
54 (1977). Katz involved a conservatorship; other areas listed by the court in which religious
freedom claims have arisen include polygamy, Sunday closing laws, taxation, child support, sex
education, prisons, and compulsory medical treatment.
102. See In re Serna, 76 Cal. App. 3d at 1020 n.6, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 355 n.6. Serna
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A recent example of the dual standard applied in California
constitutional cases is found in Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Philibosian.103 Although' the case arose under the establishment
clause of the California Constitution,' 4 California courts treat free
exercise claims in a similar manner. The court explained:
With certain exceptions not here relevant, California courts
alone determine the rights guaranteed by the California Consti-
tution so long as those rights extend equal or greater protection
to those guaranteed by the federal Constitution under totally
similar provisions of the Bill of Rights. Therefore, we examine
the constitutionality of the proposed action on independent state
grounds.'0 1
The court examined the applicable California case law but
found it to be inadequate to resolve the issue. To remedy the
situation, the court thus turned to federal cases "as they seem[ed]
compelling guides to uncharted state grounds."' 0 6
The standard of review employed in Feminist Women's Health
Center presents a problem when applied in free exercise cases. State
free exercise claimants should receive protection equal to or greater
than the federal guarantee. However, the present standard adhered
to by California courts, articulated in People v. Woody,' provides
free exercise claimants less protection than appears to be granted by
the United States Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Board. °8
California courts continue to apply a group centrality standard to
free exercise claims while federal courts extend protection to individ-
ual claims which are not related to the tenets of an organized reli-
gious group.
dealt with the religious rights of prisoners. Addressing the constitutional free exercise issue, the
court stated:
The discussion of constiti.ional rights which follows must be interpretive of the
California Constitution's guarantee of religioas freedom (Art. 1, § 4), as well as
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The analysis involves both
state and federal precedents since the federal cases are dispositive of the federal
constitutional issue, while both state and federal cases are instructive on the
state constitutional issue.
Id. See also Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345,
367 (1976) (challenge to the constitutionality of the California public school financing system);
U.S. v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1914) (free exercise of rights of Mormons and
polygamy).
103. 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1984).
104. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
105. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1086, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
106. Id. at 1086, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
107. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
108. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
1987]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
California is in need of a clear and accurate test which will
afford religious freedom the protection guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. The importance of the free exercise guarantee
may be explained as follows:
Preference must be accorded the free exercise guarantee because
it has substantive meaning within the context of the First
Amendment, it is concerned with the life and soul of the indi-
vidual in the attainment of capacities, and it is related to the
interests of minority groups. A violation of the Free Exercise
Clause does much more than erode a basic principle. It is essen-
tially an infringement that is real, never abstract, and it is a
wrong with injury - for severe psychic turmoil has been caused
by the compelled violation of conscience.'"
Because severe consequences result when religious freedom is denied,
the inconsistencies within the federal and California free exercise
standards must be addressed.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL
STANDARDS
The problems plaguing California courts in the free exercise
arena arise directly from the lack of a definite standard in the federal
law. As one commentator aptly stated: "The Supreme Court still
shows a lack of concern for the development of specific line-drawing
techniques; and religious liberty continues to receive something less
than the protection and promotion it rightfully deserves."
'
"
0
When the United States Supreme Court refuses to develop clear
rules for constitutionally protected areas, lower courts are forced to
interpret federal law in ways which they see fit or rely solely on
state law. It is acceptable for California courts to rely on California
case law unless that law provides inadequate protection to a feder-
ally guaranteed right.
1
The inadequate degree of protection presently afforded religious
freedom in California results from two obstacles encountered by the
courts in the adjudication of free exercise claims. The first obstacle is
the definition of religion employed by the United States Supreme
Court. The second is the conflict between the centrality and longev-
ity standards of People v. Woody,' 1 2 and the individuality standard
109. Sheffer, supra note 5, at 548.
110. Id. at 533.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
112. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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of Thomas v. Review Board.113
A. Definitional Problems
1. United States Supreme Court
"Free exercise of religion" is not self-defining, but emotion-
laden and susceptible to varied and contradictory definitions. " 4
Courts seek a delicate balance when defining religion for constitu-
tional purposes. Since a definition of religion is inherent in every free
exercise claim, religion must be defined in some manner, or the free
exercise of religion is rendered meaningless. At the same time, how-
ever, any definition must include all religions, without favoring
any." 5
With the adoption of the Seeger-Welsh definition of religion,"'
the United States Supreme Court provided an expansive interpreta-
tion of religion. The present definition, "a sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by . . . God""' 7 in the lives of orthodox believers, might
be viewed as including all secular theories or philosophies. As a re-
sult, no objective criteria for the boundaries of religion remain:
Courts may, at most, apply general tests of psychic function -
or when dealing with institutions, of institutional form and
functions. Courts may test the sincerity of the claimant, but his
characterization of his beliefs or activities as religious would
seem to play a major, if not an exclusive role in deciding
whether they are [religious]. "'
When religion is defined in subjective terms of the beliefs or
ideas which are important to each individual, the traditional distinc-
tions between religion and non-religion are eradicated. Traditionally,
religion has included belief in a deity or an ultimate ideal and a
-concern about the after-life. The Seeger-Welsh definition" 9 extends
religion to include any theory, belief, philosophy or idea to which a
person is committed. One author has interpreted the erosion of "reli-
113. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
114. R. MILLER, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 8 (1977).
115. Clancy and Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems in Concep-
tual Clarity and Constitutional Consideration, 17 ME. L. REV. 143 (1965).
116. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
117. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
118. Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis.
L. REV. 217, 264.
119. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
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gion" in the following manner:
To some people, the most important thing is God; to others it
may be the categorical imperative, the pleasure or pain that
humans (and animals?) feel, human rights, national glory, the
U.S. Constitution, the free market, the class struggle, the battle
of the sexes, the liberation of an oppressed racial or ethnic
group, the love of power or fame, the life of the mind, artistic or
athletic excellence, the bottle, or the needle."' 0
The definition of religion has been eroded to the point of being
useless. Only if belief rests "solely on considerations of policy, prag-
matism, or expediency,"12 will it fall outside of the boundaries of
religion under the current Supreme Court standard.
At this point, a question arises: what is not religion? If every
concern to which a person decides to commit falls in the category of
religion, "religion" holds no special meaning. The free exercise
clause dissolves into the first amendment, and religious liberty be-
comes a mere subset of the general grants of free speech and
thought. 22
2. California
California courts are confronted with definitional problems
similar to those faced by the United States Supreme Court. The defi-
nition set forth in Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda" '2
encompasses the Seeger-Welsh test. According to the Fellowship of
Humanity court, "[tlhe only inquiry in such a case is the objective
one of whether or not the belief occupies the same place in the lives
of its holders that the orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of believing
majorities. '1 2 4
Although the California appellate court in Fellowship of Hu-
manity appeared to embrace the federal Seeger-Welsh definition, it
also created a separate general definition of religion.125 California
courts place severe limits on the boundaries of religion compared to
those imposed by the United States Supreme Court. Unlike the fed-
eral standard, for a belief to qualify as religious in California, a
120. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72
CALIF. L. Ra~v. 817, 834 (1984).
121. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-43.
122. For a succinct discussion of the opposite point of view in this area, see generally
Comment, supra note 30.
123. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
124. Id. at 692, 315 P.2d at 406.
125. See infra text accompanying note 127.
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group must exist which openly expresses and observes the tenets of
the particular religious belief.126
California courts face an ironic situation. They are required to
define religion at least as broadly as the United States Supreme
Court, yet the Seeger-Welsh definition expands religion so far as to
render the term virtually meaningless. State courts design their own
definitions of religion out of the need to have clear rules by which to
adjudicate their cases.
As a result of the inconsistency with the federal definition, the
Fellowship of Humanity definition of religion creates numerous
problems for California free exercise claimants. The California defi-
nition of religion incorporates four elements: (1) a belief, not
necessarily referring to supernatural powers; (2) a cult, involving a
gregarious association openly expressing the belief; (3) a system of
moral practice directly resulting from adherence to the belief; and (4)
an organization within the cult designed to observe the tenets of the
belief.1 1 7 Elements one and three are compatible with the federal
Seeger-Welsh definition because they do not require belief in a Su-
preme Being. The primary conflict thus results from the application
of the second and fourth elements of the Fellowship of Humanity
definition of religion. An explanation of this conflict follows.
Most commentators agree that the United States Supreme
Court utilizes the Seeger-Welsh notion of religion as a guide in free
exercise claims. 28 Under this definition, a belief need not be com-
mon to a "cult" or religious group to qualify as religious for first
amendment purposes. The Court concluded in Welsh v. United
States' 9 that Welsh's isolated personal opposition to U.S. public
policy fell within the Selective Service Act exemption. It follows that
similar claims would be considered "religious" for first amendment
purposes and adjudicated under the Ballard, Yoder, Sherbert and
Thomas free exercise tests of sincerity, centrality, longevity and indi-
viduality. One author's justification of the expansive Supreme Court
definition of religion is that: "Courts can nurture a humane context
for religious claims by interpreting 'religion' to include any belief or
belief system by which a person creates, in his own scheme of things,
126. Id.
127. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 693, 315 P.2d at 406.
128. One author has suggested: "The Seeger opinion purports to be interpreting the
Selective Service Act, but the interpretation is so strained that commentators have assumed that
the Court had constitutional considerations in mind." Johnson, supra note 120, at 833. See
also L. PFEFFER, supra note 22; Galanter, supra note 118, at 264.
129. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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a meaningful order for his world, and to which he binds himself by
an unreserved seriousness or intense faith."' 30
The California approach, however, fails to promote such a
"humane context" for free exercise claims. Under Fellowship of Hu-
manity v. County of Alameda, 3' a claim such as Welsh's would be
excluded from free exercise protection. A personal and individual be-
lief, regardless of its sincerity, fails the second and fourth elements of
the test. Unless a claimed belief is openly expressed and the tenets
thereof are practiced by all or a significant portion of a cult, "reli-
gious" is an improper characterization of the belief.
The conflicts created by the discord between the federal and
California definitions of religion parallel the problems arising under
the free exercise tests. Two cases embody the free exercise conflict:
Thomas v. Review Board' and People v. Woody. 3
From the mid-1960s until 1980, federal and California free ex-
ercise claims were adjudicated under identical standards. In either
forum, a sincerely held religious belief, central to an organized reli-
gious group, received the strictest constitutional scrutiny."" Cases
such as Mullaney v. Woods'3 5 lead to the conclusion that California
courts continue to follow the group centrality standard of People v.
Woody.' 3
3. Individuality versus Centrality and Longevity
The United States Supreme Court departed from the group
centrality standard in 1981 with Thomas v. Review Board.'3
Thomas introduced the individuality element into free exercise re-
view and shifted the focus away from group centrality.1"8 Since
130. Comment, supra note 30, at 762.
131. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
132. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
133. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
134. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
135. 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979).
136. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). See supra notes 84-93 and
accompanying text.
137. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
138. The Supreme Court has not taken the opportunity to refine the parameters of
Thomas, but the case has received approval in several lower courts. See, e.g., Callahan v.
Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 1981).
Though the district court did not have available the guidance of the Su-
preme Court analysis in Thomas, since it was decided after the court's decision,
that case established that "the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs
which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect," 450 U.S. at 715
(1981).
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Thomas' beliefs were protected even though they were not a cardinal
tenet of the Jehovah's Witnesses' faith,"3 9 it remains unclear exactly
how far the Court will extend the decision.
The Thomas decision casts doubt on the continuing validity of
the People v. Woody standard. 40 In reference to this conflict, one
author concluded:
This position, if logically applied, would dramatically change
free exercise law by rendering the group centrality standard
impotent. Instead of using the standards of the claimant's or-
ganized religion to define what is basic or cardinal for free-exer-
cise purposes, the Court's focus may now rest upon the beliefs
of the claimant himself.""
Although Thomas appears to erode the group centrality stan-
dard, it fails as a guide to lower courts due to its ambiguity. On one
hand, the United States Supreme Court introduced a new element
into free exercise review: the protection of beliefs not shared by all
the members of a religious sect, as long as they are not completely
bizarre and non-religious in motivation. 4" On the other hand,
Thomas presents a great deal of confusion through its failure to
recognize the conflicts it creates with Sherbert v. Verner'43 and Wis-
consin v. Yoder."' The Court relied on other aspects of these cases
throughout the Thomas decision, but a discussion of group centrality
was conspicuously absent.
Another limiting factor of Thomas was the petitioner's member-
ship in a well-established religious group, the Jehovah's Witnesses.
Thomas' claim, founded upon his religious belief, was based on
church and biblical teachings. Therefore, no questions pertaining to
whether the belief was bizarre or non-religious in motivation ever
arose.
Thomas' membership in the church also raised questions per-
taining to the longevity of a religious group. In both Wisconsin v.
Yoder and People v. Woody, 14 the long history of each group's
658 F.2d at 685.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
140. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
141. Comment, Aid to Parochial Schools: A Free Exercise Perspective, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 587, 597 (1983).
142. See supra text accompanying note 67.
143. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 57-67.
144. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
145. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
146. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). See supra notes 92-93 and
accompanying text.
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religious activity played a decisive role in the claimant's victory. The
Thomas Court had no real reason to question the longevity factor;
the decision was, in fact, aided by Thomas' membership in a well-
established, historically based church. It remains unclear whether the
Court would be so accommodating to a member of a newly estab-
lished cult or to an individual holding a religious belief independent
of any group affiliation.
A challenge to the longevity factor would be relevant in both
California and federal courts. The requirement that a particular be-
lief be tied to a religious group with a long history of religious
activity effectively denies review to claims by members of newly es-
tablished groups. Such a standard cannot mesh with the religious
pluralism pervading our society.1 ,7 As one commentator has ex-
pressed: "The creation of one rule for well-established religions, and
a different rule for religions newly discovered must never be
allowed." 48
Along with discriminating against newly established religious
groups, the joint requirements of group centrality and longevity also
fail to protect sincere religious beliefs of individuals who are not af-
filiated with any religious organization. If the federal Seeger-Welsh
definition of religion is employed, it logically follows that individuals'
beliefs which meet the definition should receive free exercise protec-
tion. The longevity of a belief is irrelevant to this definition of
religion. As a deciding element in free exercise review, the longevity
factor cuts off protection from a significant number of potentially
valid claims.
California's reluctance to advance free exercise protection be-
yond the group centrality and longevity standards set forth in Woody
is easily understood." As a guide to lower courts, the United States
Supreme Court's Thomas decision merely confuses a previously un-
clear area. The case appears to extend free exercise protection to
147. Wood, Editorial: New Religions and the First Amendment, 24 J. CHURCH &
STATE 455, 455-56 (1982).
American religious pluralism is rooted in freedom and equality, not tolera-
tion. Integral to the American concept of religious freedom is that "in our sys-
tem," as Leo Pfeffer has written, "all religions are equal and none is less or
more equal than others." The First Amendment serves to protect all religions,
old and new against government harassment, intrusion, injury, and discrimina-
tion. It is in this context that new religions are to be assured in a free society.
Equality before the law is essential to religious liberty as to all other civil liber-
ties and civil rights ....
id.
148. Sheffer, supra note 5, at 542.
149. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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individual beliefs but offers no real guidance as to which individual
beliefs fall within the free exercise clause. It remains unclear
whether Thomas stands for the protection of the sincerely held reli-
gious belief of any individual or is limited to easily recognizable
beliefs of well-established religious groups. Because Thomas can ei-
ther be read broadly, offering protection to any sincere belief, or
merely as a minor expansion of the group centrality standard, lower
courts are forced to adjudicate free exercise cases under an ambigu-
ous standard.
V. PROPOSAL
California courts are in need of a clear guide to aid in the deter-
mination of free exercise claims. A standard which will provide
religious freedom the protection guaranteed by the first amendment
must aid courts in determining the threshold characterization of a
sincere religious belief.
California must provide its free exercise claimants with equal or
greater protection than the first amendment grant. In order to ade-
quately align with federal law, California courts should look to the
individuality standard of Thomas v. Review Board,5 ' despite the
fact that the parameters of the standard are not clearly defined.
Support for the Thomas individuality standard can be found in Cali-
fornia case law in Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees,' even
though the case has not been followed by California courts for over
fifty years. The effect of Thomas and Hardwick is to lead courts
away from the group centrality and longevity factors of People v.
Woody' toward consideration of the sincerely held beliefs of
individuals.
A. A New Standard of Review
This comment proposes a new standard which involves a two
part analysis of a petitioner's claim. Part one is merely a refinement
of California's own definition of religion found in Fellowship of Hu-
manity v. County of Alameda. 5 Since the case purports to accept
the Supreme Court's definition of religion set forth in United States
150. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
151. 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921). See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
152. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
153. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 693, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957).
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v. Seeger'54 and Welsh v. United States,15 Fellowship of Humanity
provides a proper framework once the conflicting factors of group
association are removed."'
1. Prong One
In order for a religion to be considered for free exercise adjudi-
cation under the first prong of the new standard, it must contain: (1)
a belief which occupies a place in the life of its holder parallel to
belief in God in the lives of orthodox believers; and (2) a system of
moral practice directly following from adherence to the belief.
1 57 If
the trier of fact determines that the claimed belief reasonably falls
within the above requirements, it will be considered a religion for
free exercise purposes.
2. Prong Two
The second prong of the test deals with the particular belief as
it relates to the religion and the individual claimant. For a claim to
be protected, it must arise out of, or be rooted in, the religion ap-
proved in the first prong of the test. Most free exercise cases involve
some type of activity based on the "system of moral practice" which
the government is directly or indirectly stifling. As long as the belief/
action directly relates to the religion, it need not be central to a reli-
gious group and the individual need not be a member of a religious
group in order to receive free exercise protection.
The focus of the second prong is not on centrality but on the
individual's subjective belief. Two questions will be considered by
the reviewing court. The first is whether the claimed belief is so im-
portant to this particular individual that he would be committing a
sacrilege 58 if he did not follow it. The second inquiry focuses on
whether the individual is in a position where his only option is to
deny his faith. If there are other alternatives available whereby he
could maintain his faith, yet still comply with the law, the test will
be met and the case will advance no further. Alternatively, if the
claimant satisfies both prongs of the test, the burden will shift to the
154. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
155. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
156. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
158. Sacrilege: "The misuse, theft, desecration or profanation of anything consecrated to
a deity or regarded as sacred." Sacrilegious: "Disrespectful or irreverent toward anything re-
garded as sacred." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1141
(New College ed. 1979).
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state to prove, under traditional methods, that the infringement on
the claimant's religious freedom is justified by a compelling state
interest.
The proposed standard seeks to protect free exercise rights by
eliminating the disparities which exist between the California and
federal free exercise standards. The test embraces both the Seeger-
Welsh definition of religion15' and the Thomas standard of
individuality.160 If employed, the proposed standard would expand
free exercise protection under California law beyond beliefs which
are central to organized religious groups' 61 to the sincerely held be-
liefs of individuals.
B. Application of Proposed Standard
The effect of the proposed standard can be illustrated through
an application to the facts of Quaring v. Peterson,1 6' a case which
was recently before the United States Supreme Court. The Court
split 4-4 and issued only a memorandum opinion. 6' Quaring dealt
with an applicant for a Nebraska driver's license who refused to
have her picture taken based on her religious convictions. The claim-
ant brought an action under the free exercise clause against
Nebraska officials to compel them to issue her a license without a
picture. Quaring's refusal to have her photograph taken derived
from a literal interpretation of the Second Commandment
prohibition:
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath,
or that is in the water under the earth.'"
Quaring believed that this commandment forbid her from possessing
an image of anything in creation. Not only did she refuse to allow
her photograph to appear on a driver's license, she possessed no pic-
tures of her wedding, family or friends, did not own a television set,
and had no decorations in her house depicting objects of nature. If
food was packaged in containers with picture on the labels, Quaring
either removed the label or covered the picture with black ink.1"
159. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
161. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
162. 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984).
163. Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 9492 (1986).
164. Exodus 20:4, Deuteronomy 5:8.
165. Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1123.
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Quaring's beliefs stemmed from her personal study of the Bible. Al-
though she attended a Pentecostal church, she was not a member and
her beliefs were not shared by other church members. 6
Under the current California standard set forth in Fellowship of
Humanity v. County of Alameda' " and People v. Woody,' 68 Quar-
ing's belief that driver's license photographs are "graven images" 69
would not qualify for free exercise protection. The claim would fail
in two ways. First, since Quaring was not a member of a group
which openly expresses and practices the belief, her claim would fall
short of the Fellowship of Humanity' definition of religion. Second,
even if the reviewing court was lenient and classified the belief as
"religious" because of the biblical basis, Quaring's claim would fail
under the group centrality standard of People v. Woody.' Unlike
peyote in the Woody"' case, Quaring's refusal to have her picture
taken is not a practice which is central to a historically based reli-
gious organization.
Under the first prong of the proposed standard, Quaring's belief
would qualify as religious. Although her belief was unrelated to the
beliefs of any religious group, it arose from what Quaring believed
to be a biblical prohibition against having her photograph taken . 73
Therefore, her belief would qualify as a belief which occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to belief in God in the lives
of orthodox believers.' 74
Quaring also followed a system of moral practice directly aris-
ing out of adherence to the belief.175 She practiced her belief that
photographs of creations in nature were graven images by refusing to
have her photograph placed on her driver's license. This belief also
permeated other aspects of her daily life. Thus, Quaring's belief
clearly falls within the boundaries of religion set forth by the pro-
posed standard.
Under the second prong of the proposed standard, California
courts would approach Quaring's claim in the following manner.
First, because she sincerely believes that the second commandment is
166. Id.
167. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
168. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
169. 728 F.2d at 1123. See supra text accompanying note 163.
170. Fellowship of Humanity, 153 Cal. App. 2d at 693, 315 P.2d at 406.
171. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
172. Id.
173. 728 F.2d at 1123.
174. See supra text accompanying note 127.
175. Id.
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violated by creating a likeness of God's creation,176 the placement of
her photograph on the license would constitute a sacrilege in Quar-
ing's mind. Second, in order to be granted the right to drive in
Nebraska, state law requires all persons to hold a valid driver's li-
cense. 17 Quaring was faced with a situation in which her only alter-
natives were to allow her photograph on the license in contravention
of her faith, to drive illegally, or to not drive at all.
Quaring's claim, therefore, would satisfy both prongs of the
proposed test. Her belief would qualify as a religion under the new
definition, and although it was not central to an organized group, it
was central in Quaring's life. She was confronted with a choice of
denying her faith or foregoing the right to drive in the state. Quar-
ing v. Peterson provides an example of the type of genuine, sincere
religious beliefs which are guaranteed protection by the free exercise
clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
California courts reviewing free exercise claims are limited by
the standards delineated by the United States Supreme Court. Al-
though the Supreme Court has refused to create clear rules in the
free exercise area, lower courts must determine the outer limits of
federal constitutional protection and design standards which align
with the limits. One problem which has arisen as a result of the
inadequate Supreme Court guidance for free exercise claims is that
in California, free exercise claimants receive less protection under
California law than under federal law.
The causes and effects of the conflict between the California
and federal free exercise standards are highlighted through an exam-
ination of two areas. First, the United States Supreme Court and
California definitions of religion vary. Second, there are inconsisten-
cies between the most recent Supreme Court free exercise decision,
Thomas v. Review Board,1 ' and the leading California case, People
v. Woody, 179 which create conflicts for state courts.
In order to resolve the conflicts and provide clear guidance for
California courts, this comment offers a new test. The proposed
standard embraces the current United States Supreme Court free ex-
ercise tests but eliminates the ambiguity found therein by focusing on
176. 728 F.2d at 1122.
177. Id. at 1123.
178. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
179. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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the nature of the individual's subjective belief. The result is a clear
standard which provides free exercise claimants in California the
same degree of protection guaranteed under the first amendment of
the United States Constitution.
The free exercise clauses of the United States and California
Constitutions should protect genuine, sincere religious beliefs. Only
when a person is faced with the prospect of either complying with
the law or denying his faith is the free exercise of religion being
stifled.
Melissa L. Nelson
